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PERCEIVED CIRCUMSTANCES, INFERENCES OF INTENT
AND JUDGMENTS OF OFFENSE SERIOUSNESS
MARC RIEDEL*
collection, for example, the most innovative aspect of the index research was the development
of an empirical measure of offense seriousness.
In considering offense seriousness, a second
important issue concerns the manner in which
nonoffenders view the criminal act, what this
means for the processing of the criminal in the
legal system, and how the nonoffender's views
of the criminal act may create and reinforce a
deviant role. Whether we consider less well
known theories about economic and social
structural determinants of the social reactions
to crime0 or more contemporary versions of labelling theory, 7 a measure of seriousness is important in testing and refining these theories.
The point of departure for this paper turns
on a problem which is relevant to the SellinWolfgang index both as a potential social indicator and an empirical referent of theoretical
terms. The original Measurement of Delinquency8 and many of the subsequent replications emphasized the methodological problems involved in constructing and using such
an index; there has been little attempt to understand what cognitive processes cause judgments of seriousness to be made. What is utilized in making seriousness judgments in
addition to, or instead of, amounts of injury,
theft, or damage? It is, of course, useful to
know whether members of other cultures, social classes or statuses differ or agree in their
judgments of seriousness. But once we have
learned that individuals make certain judgments about the seriousness of a given crime,
we still would like to know how they make
these judgments.

INTRODUCTION

The attempt by Sellin and Wolfgang" to
provide a more objective and reliable measure
of the amount and relative seriousness of offenses can be viewed as a response to the
problems and issues in two areas in criminology. First, as a system of collecting, classifying and presenting data on crime, the Uniform
Crime Reports have been criticized for their
deficiences as early as 1931. In that year Sam
Bass Warner criticized the practice of substituting assaults and larceny for robbery in the
reporting of crimes and concluded that it
would be far better to have no statistics than
the false and biased statistics represented by
the Uniform Crime Reports. 2 More recent critiques, 3 and studies of hidden delinquency 4 and
criminal victimization . have made it clear that
improved methods of gathering data on crime
are needed.
While the Sellin-Wolfgang index provided
more useful criteria for gathering information
on crime by focusing on the delinquent event
rather than a legal label as the unit of data
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Drawing a theoretical orientation from social psychological theory, the purpose of this
paper is to explore what effect differing perceptions of circumstances of the crime have
on seriousness judgements. The problem is
prompted by the conclusions of the original research that judgments of seriousness reflect a
broad value consensus about the nature of
crime. If seriousness judgments reflect a reaction to the violative act and a response to the
affront to agreed upon values, then the differing circumstances of the crime and inferences
of intent would seem to be of secondary importance in making a judgment about -the seriousness of a given crime. Where the latter is
true, the results of the analysis should conform
to the replication criteria given by Sellin and
Wolfgang. Conversely, where differing circumstances lead to differences in judgments, the
results of the analysis should not be expected
to conform to replication criteria.
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In the present study we have interpreted the
two replication criteria given by Sellin and
Wolfgang in the following way. First, the regression coefficient or slope of any two groups
under comparison should be close to 1.00,
which indicates that the two groups under
comparison agree in the judgments of seriousness. If one group perceives greater or lesser
increases in seriousness, the coefficient will be
larger or smaller than 1.00.
In addition to the criterion of similarity of
slopes, there is a second, minimal criterion.
When magnitude estimation scores are plotted
against each other on log-log paper, the line
joining the points should be straight. The
strength of the relationship is measured by a
product-moment correlation, and should be
near 1.00. This latter criterion refers to the
similarity of shapes in comparisons.
PERCEIVED CIRCUMSTANCES AND INFERENCES
OF INTENT

THE SERIOUSNESS INDEX AND REPLICATION

CRITERIA

Because a description of the development of
the seriousness index is given by other papers
in this symposium, it will suffice to indicate that
judgments of the seriousness of crimes do not
seem to be influenced by the age of the offender. Sellin and Wolfgang asked raters to
rate the same offenses according to whether
the offender was aged thirteen, seventeen,
twenty-seven, or an unspecified number of years.
From the analysis of all ratings, the authors
concluded:
The most strongly supported conclusion on
the basis of the data at hand is that all the
raters, although unconstrained in their use of
the magnitude scale assignments, tended to so
assign the magnitude estimations that the seriousness of the crimes is evaluated in a similar
way, without significant differences, by all the
groups. The age of the offender does not particularly color a person's judgment about the
seriousness of the offense. A pervasive social
agreement about what is serious and what is
not appears to emerge, and this agreement
transcends simple qualitative concordance; it
extends to the estimated numerical degree of
seriousness of these offenses. 9

For those crimes where there is some consensus about the undesirability of the act, circumstances are assumed to be important to
perceivers because they provide the basis for
inferring intent to the actor. Presumably, making a judgement about the seriousness of a violative act would include the element of
whether the person intended to commit the act,
or whether it happened because the actor could
not prevent its occurrence.
Criminal law recognizes the importance of
perceived circumstances in emphasizing the
concept of mens rea or intent; it upholds the
principle that there is no crime unless there is
a concurrence of act and intent.' 0
Intent is, however, a subjective state; it is
inferred from immediate and existing circumstances in terms of a belief about what the
actor wanted to do. While the definition of intent used in this study was developed by Heider," it is similar to a legal concept of intent.
The legal concept of intent was not used because of the difficulties of specifying what
10 Marshall & Clark, The Legal Definitions of
Crime and Criminals, in THE SocIoLoaY OF C ium
AND DELINQUENCY 15 (M. Wolfgang, L. Savitz &
N. Johnston eds. 1970).
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is meant by intent in cases of criminal
negligence.12 According to Heider,23 when we
infer from circumstances why a person acted
as he did and why the act took a particular
form, the explanation comes to a stop when
the perceiver finds sufficient reason, i.e. when
an intention or motive is given that has the
quality of being reason enough. By contrast,
an impersonal scientific analysis engages in a
potentially infinite regress of cause and effect.
The proximate cause of the effect before us is
the effect of a more distant cause.
While persons are viewed by perceivers as
self-activating, self-energizing systems, it must
be recognized that actors may have identical
intent while manifesting wide variations in responses. Conversely, actors may manifest similar responses while having different types of
intent. Heider's theory attempted to explain
how perceivers find invariances of intent and
motive from the multiplicities of observed activity.
Drawing from Heiderian theory, Jones and
Davis' 4 proposed a theory of correspondent inferences. The concept of correspondence can be
illustrated as follows. Suppose that we observe
A and B working together on a task. We note
that A gives orders to B, monitors his performance, and shows his displeasure with the
quality and quantity of B's work. What we can
infer about A's intentions and disposition depend upon the action alternatives we see as
available to A. If the situation were one in
which A and B were freely interacting, we
would conclude that A was quite arrogant and
domineering. On the other hand, if we were
informed that A had been given instructions to
assume a directive leadership role, we would
be less likely to regard his dominating behavior as an indication of his personal qualities.
It is the former rather than the latter instance which is high in correspondence; the
most correspondent inference is one that assumes that domineering behavior is a direct reflection of the person's intention to dominate.
12 P.
(1960).
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Correspondence of inference declines as the action to be explained is constrained by the setting in which it occurs. To be able to infer intent from the circumstances of the action, the
actor must be perceived as having choices
other than the one chosen. As it becomes more
difficult to infer other choices, it becomes more
difficult to infer intent.
Using the concept of correspondent inferences, hypotheses were generated for eight factors in a 2x4 experimental design. While all
the results will be reported, only the hypothesis
using the factors of threat and reward will be
developed in this article.
The condition of threat would seem to present fewer choices and greater constraints than
the condition of reward. Threatening the offender with death or injury unless he commits
an offense places the emphasis on preventing
the individual from avoiding commission of the
offense. The implied assumption is that the individual does not want to commit the offense,
but threat closes off all reasonable choices
which avoid committing the offense. By contrast, rewarding the offender with money or a
job for committing the crime places an emphasis on reinforcement for the right choice.
Other choices may not be reinforced by the
person requesting the commission of the crime,
but they remain choices reinforceable in other
ways. Avoidance of the criminal act simply
leads to a lack of one kind of reinforcement. If
fewer constraints, and therefore greater, intent,
are perceived when the offender is rewarded,
in contrast to when the offender is threatened,
it is hypothesized that the same offenses will
be rated more seriously under conditions of
perceived reward in comparison to conditions
of perceived threat.
RESEARCH DESIGN

Two classes of variables were used to determine how seriousness scores would be modified
if the respondent were made aware of the circumstances of the offenses. The first set, environmental constraints, are categories which
have in common some force or set of -forces
external to the offender which can induce him
to commit the offense. The four categories are
threat, victim precipitation, reward and':alien
control. A definition of each of these catego-
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ries was presented to every respondent as part
of the questionnaire.
Threat
Threat to the offender exists when other
groups or individuals tell the offender they
will physically injure or kill him unless he
commits the offense.
Victim Precipitation
Victim precipitation refers to circumstances
in which the victim created a set of opportunities for the offender to use in committing the offense. In offenses involving violence, the victim was the first to show a
deadly weapon. In offenses involving property loss, the victim, for the first time, presented the offender with an opportunity to
commit the offense. For example, the victim
may, for the first time, leave his car unlocked in a neighborhood where it may be
stolen.
Reward
Reward of the offender exists when other
groups or individuals tell the offender they
will pay him money or give him a better
job if he commits the offense.
Alien Control
Alien control of the offender refers to behavior which is induced by a foreign or artificial substance which leads to a compulsion or a reduction of inhibitions to the
point where the offender will commit the offense.
A second class of variables, personal dispositions, are categories which have in common
some forces or set of forces internal to the offender which can induce him to commit the offense. The two categories are hostile attitudes
and subcultural values. A definition of each of
these categories was presented to every respondent as part of the questionnaire.
Hostile Attitude
Hostile attitude of the offender means that
he possesses a very intense and persistent
anger or aggression toward the victim. It is
accompanied by a period of planning devoted to ways of venting his anger on the
victim.
Subcultural Values
Subcultural values of the offender refer to
beliefs, ways of life, etc., which conflict with
those of the society at large. Because of his

membership in the subculture, these beliefs,
ways of life, etc., are considered "right" and
"good" by the offender and justify settling
injustices by means which ignore or oppose
the law.
The two classes of constraints, environmental constraints and personal dispositions, with
their attendant factors, were presented to 173
subjects using the 2x4 experimental design
diagrammed in Figure 1.
As Figure 1 indicates, the factors were arranged in such a manner so that each respondent was presented with one factor from the
class of environmental constraints and one factor from the class of personal dispositions.
Six offenses were chosen from the 141 offenses used by Sellin and Wolfgang. 15 One set
of two offenses was concerned only with injury to the victim, the second set had only a
component of theft, while the third set of two
offenses had differing amounts of damage. Not
only were offenses chosen which had either injury, theft, or damage, but the amounts of each
in the set of two varied from small to large.
Thus, while the first offense resulted in death
to the victim, the second resulted only in
minor injury to the victim. Offenses were chosen in this manner so that comparisons could
be made among ratings of injury, theft, and
damage if experimental stimuli altered the seriousness scores. The offenses are given below
and listed by a number which is used throughout the study.
1. The offender stabs a person to death.
2. The offender stabs a victim with a knife.
The victim is treated by a physician but
requires no further treatment.
3. The offender embezzles $1,OaO from his
employer.
4. The offender embezzles $5 from his employer.
5. The offender breaks into a locked car,
steals, damages and abandons it.
6. The offender breaks into a locked car and
later abandons it undamaged.
We used a control group for additional comparisons because it was extremely difficult to
devise stimulus situations which were identical
across all offenses. The study used volunteer
subjects from four colleges in the Philadelphia
15 SELLIN & WOLFGANG,

supra note 1.
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FIGURE 1
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS AND NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH CONDITION

Environmental Constraints

Personal dispositions
Hostile attitude ..............

Subcultural values ...........

Threat

Victim precipitation

Reward

Alien control

Cell 1
N =21

Cell 2
N =20

Cell 3
N=20

Cell 4
N =20

Cell 5
N =20

Cell 6
N =20

Cell 7
N =32

Cell 8
N =20

area. For the experimental group, sixty subjects
came from the University of Pennsylvania,
ninety-five subjects from Drexel University,
thirty-five subjects from Villanova University
and sixteen from LaSalle College. The thirtythree subjects in the control group were obtained from Drexel University and the University of Pennsylvania. No claims for representativeness of the sample are made since different
strategies were used to obtain subjects ranging
from asking for volunteers to using entire sociology classes in some schools.
We used two types of questionnaires in the
study. One type, given to the control group of
thirty-three subjects, consisted of six offenses
presented to the respondent in two random orders. The instructions and format were identical
to those used by Sellin and Wolfgang in the
original study.
The second questionnaire, given to the experimental group, (N=173), consisted of the
same six offenses presented in two random orders. For each of the six offenses rated by subjects in the experimental group, a "case history" was given which described the
circumstances of the crime in a way which included one category of environmental constraints and one category of personal dispositions.
Subjects in the experimental group were
each given a questionnaire and a list of the
factor definitions. The subject was asked to
complete the section asking for sex, race, age,
year in college and major. The experimenter
then read the directions aloud while the subjects followed on their copies. They were told
how to rate the factors of importance and the

seriousness of the events and were shown a
completed example.
After reading the event, and the circumstances surrounding the offense, the respondents were asked to rate each factor as to its
importance in leading the offender to commit
the crime. The subjects were encouraged to
consult the list of definitions in deciding
whether the factor was "not important," "of
little importance," "somewhat important" or
"very important." After completing the rating
of factors, the respondents were asked to rate
the seriousness of offenses using instructions
provided by Sellin and Wolfgang. No subjects
refused to complete the questionnaire. Contrary
to instructions, two subjects used zero in rating the offenses; these scores were converted
to the smallest value given by any other respondent for that offense. Eight other respondents gave a score of infinity in rating an offense. These scores were converted to the
largest score plus one given by any other respondent for that offense.
Raw scores were converted to geometric
means for each offense and the appropriate
group, using the procedure followed by Akman
and Normandeaue in their Canadian replication study.
INDUCING INFERENCES OF INTENT FROM

HE

PERCEIVED CIRCUMSTANCES

To determine to what extent subjects in the
eight cells of the experimental group believed
the factors were important in leading the of.6Akrnan & Normandeau, Towards the Measurement of Criminality inr Canada: A Replication
Study, 1 AcrA Ctriu. 135 (1968).
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fenders to commit the offenses, the four-step
rating scale was reduced to a dichotomy. A binomial test was computed for each of the dichotomized ratings.
If. .wehad been successful in inducing the
subject to believe, after reading a case history
of the circumstances, that the factor had been
important in leading the offenders to commit
crimes, we would expect that the subject would
read the case history utilizing, for example,
"threat? and rate this factor as "very important"" while other factors would be rated as
"not important."
The stated circumstances of the offenses
were "generally successful in inducing respondents to rate factors as important or not important. Cells 1 through 4, where hostile attitude
was combined with threat, victim precipitation,
reward, and alien control, tended to be a more
effective set of stimuli than subcultural values
in combination with threat, victim precipitation, reward, and alien control. Hostile attitude
was always rated in the direction indicated in
Figure 1 for cell 1 through cell 4, but not cell
5 through cell 8. It seemed to be rated as an
important factor in leading the offender to
commit the crime whether it was present or
not in the stated circumstances of the offense.
Subcultural values was one of the weakest
factors. The respondents did not find it significantly "not important" in offense #4 in cell
1, offenses #1, #2, #5 and #6 in cell 2, offense #2 in cell 3, offenses #1, #2, #3, and
#5 in cell 4. Conversely, in cells 5 through 8,
where it was part of the circumstances of the
offense, subcultural values was rated as "very
important' in leading the offender to commit
the offense, according to the binomial tests, in
all cels except cell 6. However, except in cell
6, respondents rated hostile attitude as "very
important" also. Cell 6 showed very few significant differences for either subcultural values or hostile attitude.
One possible interpretation of the results
found with subcultural values is that the respondents required psychological variables as
mediating between behavior and values. In
other words, subcultural values would operate
through hostile attitude, threat, etc. This analysis by.cultural levels explains the findings with
subcultural values and hostile attitude as well
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as the frequent rating of it as "very important" in other cells. To explore these variations in ratings of intent, the effect of collapsing rows and columns and geometric means is
reported in the next section.
Support for the Jones and Davis'17 theory of
correspondent inferences was limited. Earlier
in this paper it was suggested that intent, inferred from the circumstances of the crime,
would be easier to infer in the case of reward
in contrast to threat. While the difference is
small, the opposite seems to be the case; threat
was perceived to be "very important" 95 per
cent of the time, while reward was perceived
to be important 87 per cent of the time it was
present. Indeed, "threat" was one of the most
successful factors in the experiment. We did
not find any consistent differences among any
of the other factors.
The results indicate that within the limits of
experimental conditions, respondents seem to
be able to make inferences of intent utilizing
the circumstances of the offense. However, we
found little support for the Jones and Davis
theory specifying relative difficulty in inferring
different types of intent.
THE EFFEcT OF INFERENCES OF INTENTION

JUDGMENTS OF SERIOUSNESS

Geometric means were calculated for each of
the six offenses of each cell in the experimental group and the control group. (Table I).
To determine whether any of the experimental conditions had an effect on the geometric
means, we computed regression and correlation
coefficients and plotted geometric means on
log-log paper. Only the regression coefficients
(Table II) and correlation coefficients (Table
III) will be reported here.
If inferences of intent had an effect on
judgements of seriousness then both the regression and correlation coefficients should differ from results posited by the scaling criteria.
As Table II indicates, the regression coefficients
are substantially different from the hypothesized criteria of 1.00. However, examination of
Table III suggests that the seriousness index
meets the minimal criteria of correlation coefficients near 1.00. With the exception of the
correlations of cell 3 with the other cells and
17

Jones & Davis, sipra note 14.
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TABLE I
GEOMETRIC MEANS AND SAMPLE SIZE ON SIX OFFENSES FOR EIGHT
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS AND THE CONTROL GROUP

Offense

Cell I

Cell 2

Cell 3

Cell 4

Cell 5

1

1968.45
194.22
24.78
4.51
26.98
8.61
21

1027.620
64.46
25.48
8.35
20.68
10.74
20

895.16
559.47
27.60
8.48
24.48
12.57
20

705.16
96.35
33.25
6.21
26.71
8.85
20

1763.40
71.81
28.13
5.13
24.73
7.27
20

2
3
4
5
6
N

Cell 6

Cell 7

325.03
54.93
30.45
7.74
24.63
12.67
20

894.26
216.37
30.42
11.89
36.60
16.98
32

Cell 8

Control

2869.81
108.42
38.40
6.01
33.11
12.03
20

8552.68
672.50
28.82
4.97
41.64
16.31
33

TABLE II
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ON SIX OFFENSES FOR EIGHT EXPERIMENTAL
CONDITIONS AND THE CONTROL GROUP

Cell 1

Cell 2

Cell 3

1.79
Cell I ................... 1.92
.92
. .52........
Cell 2............
.79 ........
.42
Cell 3 ............
.64
.67
.35
Cell 4 ............
1.56
1.73
.90
Cell 5............
.33
.35
.18
Cell 6............
.85
.84
.44
Cell 7 ............
2.55
2.82
Cell 8 ............ 1.47
7.79
8.40
Control .......... 4.38

Cell 4

Cell 5

Cell 6

Cell 7

Cell 8

Control

,.23
5.47
2.24
.68
2.84
1.11
.12
.35
1.16
2.85
.58
1.48
.10
.28
1.02
2.33
.45
1.22
.24
.08
.79
1.92
.39
........
.21
.61
1.20
2.56 ........ 4.93
.04
.12
.41
.20 . .......
.52
.10
.30
2.41 ........
.48
1.25
.34
3.26 ........
8.03
1.63
4.17
2.97 . ......
9.76
23.94
4.84
12.44

the control group, the correlations range from
.98 to 1.00.
In general, there is little evidence to support
the hypothesis that inferences of intent alter
judgements of seriousness. With the exception
of offense #1 and offense #2 (injury offenses), Table I indicates similar values for the
geometric means of the other four offenses.
Variations in the values of the geometric
means for the two injury offenses may reflect
the chance fluctuations due to computing
means on very small samples rather than the
effect of experimental stimulus. Because we
gathered information on the subjects' sex, age,
year in college, area of concentration and college attended, we were able to calculate geometric means, regression and correlation coefficients for the possible categories of each
variable. While comparisons between categories met the minimal scaling criteria, the geo-

metric means of the six offenses exhibited a
pattern similar to that found in Table I. If the
experimental conditions were responsible for
the fluctuations in the geometric means of the
injury offenses, but not in the other offenses,
we should not expect the same pattern, when
the various background variables are examined.
Second, to determine the effect of sample
size on fluctuations of the geometric means, we
collapsed cell 1 through cell 4, and' cell 5
through cell 8 and calculated geometric means
for the first (N=81) and second (N=92)
row. For offense #1, the geometric means
were 1071.69 and 1105.44; for offense #2, the
geometric means were 161.58 and 108.74. The
regression coefficient for the two raw groups
was b=1.03 and the correlation coefficient was
.99. The reduced fluctuation in the geometric
means for the two injury offenses when the

MARC RIEDEL
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TABLE III
PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATIONS FOR EIGHT EXPERIMENTAL
CONDITIONS AND CONTROL GROUP
Cell 1

Cell 2

Cell 3

Cell 4

Cell I ....................
1.00
.87
1.00
Cell 2 ..........................
.85
1.00
Cell 3....................................
.88
Cell 4 ........................................
Cell 5 ...............................................
Cell 6 .......................................................
Cell 7 .............................................................
Cell8 ....................
........
...............
Control ................
...................

geometric means were computed on a larger
group suggests that the size of the sample is
the relevant factor.
To determine whether increased sample size
may have an effect on the low correlations observed in Table III, cells were combined as follows: cells 3 and 7 (reward), 1 and 5
(threat), 2 and 6 (victim precipitation), and 4
and 8 (alien control). Geometric means, regression coefficients, and correlations were obtained for each new category as well as for the
control group. For the reward condition, the
regression coefficients remain generally unchanged while the range of correlations increased to .92 to .97. This suggests that the
low correlations reported in Table III may have
been due to small sample size.

Cell 5

Cell 6

Cell 7

Cell 8

1.00
1.00
.88
1.00

1.00
1.00
.88
1.00
1.00

.99
.98
.93
.99
.98
99

1.00
1.00
.84
1.00
1.00
1.00
.98
........

................
...........................

Control

1.00
1.00
.86
1.00
1.00
1.00
.99
1.00

means of the six offenses. Given these conditions, it would be difficult to meet the scaling
criteria outlined by Sellin and Wolfgang.
The results indicate that while respondents
had little difficulty inferring intent from the
perceived circumstances, there was little support for the Jones and Davis theory that different circumstances would lead to a differential willingness to attribute intent.
Inferences of intent seem to have little effect
on seriousness judgements because the minimal
criteria of a similarity of shapes was met for

the experimental group. Fluctuations in the
geometric means and correlations seem to be
due to small sample size. While the ratios of
the score values rather than numerical similarity in values is the important element in replication, the theft and damage offense means

CONCLUSIONS

show less fluctuation than the injury offense

In an effort to determine how cognitive
processes entered into judgements of seriousness, the present study explored the effect of
differing perceived circumstances on judgements of the seriousness of six offenses. According to Heider"' and Jones and Davis, 19
perceived circumstances should lead to inferences of the offender's criminal intent. We hypothesized that the perceiver's willingness to
attribute intent to the offenders would change
across different experimental conditions and
that this, in turn, would affect the geometric

means. College students may have less consensus among themselves as to the seriousness of
injury and death to a victim in comparison to
theft or damage to property. The reason for
this difference in consensus is unclear.
Perhaps the most important conclusion of
this study is that perceivers assess the seriousness of criminal events in ways that make unimportant inferences of whether the offender
intended the act. This suggests that external
aspects of the event, such as the amount of injury, theft, or damage is all the respondent
needs to make a reliable assessment of social
injury.

18 HEIDER, supranote 11.
'19 Jones & Davis, supranote 14.

